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The Utah State Tax Commission replies to the Brief of
Appellees as follows:
I.

THE BROAD CONSTRUCTION OF § 59-10-106(1) URGED BY THE
TAXPAYERS IS IMPROPER AND IS FOUNDED ON AN ERRONEOUS
AND OVERLY-BROAD VIEW OF THE PURPOSE OF THE TAX CREDIT.
The Tax Commission has urged this Court to strictly

construe Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-106(1)(West 2004) since the
statute grants a tax credit.

This Court has applied "the

well-established principle that tax exemption statutes are
to be strictly construed against the party claiming the
exemption and all ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of
taxation." Morton International v. Auditing Div. of the Utah
State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581, 591 (Utah 1991).

That

same principle of strict construction should apply equally
to credit statutes.

3A Sutherland Statutory Construction

§66:9 (6th ed., updated 2005); State Dept. of Assessments
and Taxation v. Belcher, 553 A.2d 691, 695 (Md. 1989) (the
rule of strict construction for exemption statutes is
"equally applicable when tax credits are implicated"); Team
Specialty Products v. New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Dept.,
107 P.3d 4, 7 (N.M. App. 2004) T[t]ax credits are strictly
matters of legislative grace and are to be construed against
the taxpayer", quoting

Murphy v. Taxation and Revenue Dept.,

607 P.2d 628, 631 (N.M. App. 1979)).
1

The Taxpayers urge a

broad construction of the credit statute, contrary to the
well-reasoned policy supporting strict construction.
The Taxpayers have advanced an overly-broad view of the
purpose of the credit statute.

Nothing in § 59-10-106(1)

suggests that the Legislature anticipated the issue before
this Court.

Indeed, absence of any specific statutory

reference to the pass-through of income to S corporation
shareholders or the treatment of taxes imposed on S
corporations suggests just the opposite, i.e. that the
Legislature was merely addressing the common situation where
a Utah resident has income from sources outside of Utah and
is subjected to individual income tax in the jurisdictions
where that income was earned.

In this common situation, the

statute serves to eliminate duplicative individual income
tax.

To suggest that the purpose goes beyond this is merely

unsupported speculation on the part of the Taxpayers.
The absence of a specific statutory credit for S
corporation shareholders for taxes paid by an S corporation
led to the administrative actions underlying this appeal.
In these administrative proceedings, the Taxpayers achieved
partial victory when the Tax Commission held that a credit
would be allowed for another state's tax if the tax was

2

imposed "on income," even if the tax fell upon and was paid
by the S corporation rather than the individual
shareholders.

This result was in harmony with both Utah's

treatment of S corporations as pass-through entities as
addressed in Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-702 (West 2004), and with
a strict construction of § 59-10-106(1).

By granting a

credit for such taxes, and limiting the credit to taxes
imposed "on income," the Tax Commission asserts that there
has been compliance with the requirements of the statute and
that the purpose of the statute has been fulfilled.
Section 59-10-106(1) does not eliminate duplicative
taxation in all situations, and nothing in the statute
suggests that this was its purpose.

Shareholders of a C

corporation pay individual income tax on dividends, even
though the C corporation is subject to corporate franchise
tax on the income from which the dividends are paid.

The

Taxpayers concede that the credit under § 59-10-106(1) would
not be allowed for franchise taxes imposed on an S
corporation that are measured by something other than income
(e.g. the Texas tax on net taxable capital), thus
acknowledging the need to comply with the language of the
credit statute, yet this concession undermines their

3

assertion regarding the purpose of the statute since both
the S corporation and its shareholders are subjected to tax
in that situation.

Likewise, in this case, where an S

corporation is subject to another state's corporate
franchise tax (other than a tax "on income'') either as a
result of that state's refusal to mirror the federal passthrough treatment of S corporations (e.g. Texas) or as a
result of the S corporation's failure to make a required
state election to be afforded the pass-through treatment
(e.g. California), § 59-10-106(1) does not provide a credit
against the individual income tax of the shareholders for
the S corporation's franchise tax.1

While the shareholders are not entitled to an individual
income tax credit for the corporate franchise tax paid to
California and Texas, they do benefit from the S corporation's
deduction of such taxes. The S corporation is entitled to deduct
the California and Texas corporate franchise taxes as an expense
of doing business, thus reducing the amount of net income which
is passed through to the shareholders and included in the
shareholders' taxable income. If a credit for corporate
franchise taxes which have already been deducted from income is
granted, the double benefit of both a deduction and a credit for
the tax would accrue to the shareholders. The Taxpayers have
recognized that this would yield an unfair result and have
conceded that an add-back of the franchise tax deduction is
necessary if the credit is granted.
4

II.

TAXPAYERS' FAILURE TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN "TAXES
IMPOSED ON INCOME" AND "TAXES MEASURED BY INCOME"
FOR PURPOSES OF THE CREDIT IS IMPROPER AND IS
FOUNDED ON AN ERRONEOUS AND OVERLY-BROAD VIEW OF
THE PURPOSE OF THE TAX CREDIT.
The Taxpayers acknowledge that a distinction remains

today between "taxes imposed on income" and "taxes measured
by income."

Brief of Appellees at pp. 27-28.

Further, they

acknowledge that this distinction is important, at least in
the context of the taxation of federal obligations.

Brief

of Appellees at p. 28.
The Tax Commission agrees that this distinction remains
and is important, but further asserts that the distinction
is vital in the proper application of the credit allowed
under § 59-10-106(1).

The statutory language provides a

credit only for taxes imposed "on income."
The Taxpayers are in essence asking the Court to ignore
both the statutory language granting the credit and the
distinction between "taxes imposed on income" and "taxes
measured by income" when reviewing the California and Texas
corporate franchise taxes.

This request is once again

founded upon an asserted purpose of the credit statute that
is overly-broad and has no basis in the language of the
statute (see part I above).

The Taxpayers again suggest
5

that the realization of this alleged purpose trumps strict
construction of the statute which limits the credit to taxes
imposed "on income."

The Tax Commission urges this Court to

reject the Taxpayers' attempt to: (1) assert an overly-broad
purpose of the statute, (2) use the overly-broad purpose as
justification for abandonment of strict construction of the
credit statute, and (3) use the overly-broad purpose as
justification for ignoring the distinction between "taxes
imposed on income" and "taxes measured by income."
III.

THE TAXPAYERS' CHARACTERIZATION OF THE TEXAS
CORPORATION FRANCHISE TAX AS EITHER A TAX ON
INCOME OR A MINIMUM TAX ON CAPITAL IS INCORRECT.
While § 59-10-106(1) allows a credit for taxes imposed

"on income," the Texas corporation franchise tax is based on
a formula that includes both net taxable capital and net
taxable earned surplus components.

While the argument can

be made that the net taxable earned surplus component is
similar to net income, it is not the only component of the
Texas formula.

As set forth in Texas Tax Code § 171.002(b)

and (c) :
(b) The amount of franchise tax on each
corporation is computed by adding the
following:
(1) the amount calculated by applying the
tax rate prescribed by Subsection (a)(1)
6

to the corporation's net taxable capital;
and
(2) the difference between:
(A) the amount calculated by
applying the tax rate prescribed by
Subsection (a) (2) to the
corporation's net taxable earned
surplus; and
(B) the amount determined under
Subdivision (1).
(c) In making the computation under
Subsection (b), an amount computed under
Subsection (b)(1) or (b)(2) that is zero
or less is computed as a zero.
The Tax Commission has held that a credit is not available
for the Texas tax since it is not a tax "on income," but
rather a franchise tax calculated through the use of a
formula with two components, only one of which is similar to
net income.
The Taxpayers argue that the Texas tax is, depending
upon the amounts of net taxable earned surplus and net
taxable capital, either a tax on income in its entirety (if
4.5% of net taxable earned surplus exceeds 0.25% of net
taxable capital) or a tax on capital in its entirety (if
0.25% of net taxable capital exceeds 4.5% of net taxable
earned surplus).

This approach adopts a shortcut which

determines the correct amount of the corporate franchise
7

tax, but fails to fully reflect the formula and components
as set forth in the Texas statute.
The computation of the Texas corporation franchise tax
as set forth in the Texas statute can be illustrated using a
hypothetical of three S corporations, A, B, and C, each
having $400,000 of net taxable earned surplus, but different
amounts of net taxable capital.

Each would calculate its

Texas tax using the same statutory formula of:
0.25% x net taxable
capital
-f ((4.5% x net
taxable
earned surplus)
- (0.25% x net taxable
capital),
but not less
than
zero)

If A had $1,000,000 of net taxable capital, its Texas tax
would be computed as follows:
0.25% x $1,000,000
+ ((4.5% x $400,000)
$1,000,000),
but not less
than
zero)

-

(0.25%

x

or
$2,500
$2,500
$18,000

+ ($18,000
- $2,500)
+ $15,500 =
tax

=

If B had $10,000,000 of net taxable capital, its Texas tax
would be computed as follows:
0.25% x $10,000,000
x $10,000,000)
, but

+ ((4.5%
not less

or
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x $400,000)
than
zero)

-

(0.25%

$25,000 + zero
than zero) =
$25,000
tax

(since

$18,000

- $25,000

is

less

If C had $2,000,000 of net taxable capital, its Texas tax
would be computed as follows:
0.25% x $2,000,000
+ ((4.5% x $400,000)
$2,000,000),
but not less than
zero)

- (0.25% x

or
$5,000 + ($18,000 - $5,000)
$5,000 + $13,000 =
$18,000
tax

=

Under this hypothetical, the Taxpayers would claim that
shareholders of corporations A and C are entitled to a
credit of $18,000, while shareholders of corporation B are
not entitled to any credit since its $25,000 tax would be a
minimum tax based on capital.

Corporation B would be

treated differently, even though all three corporations had
the same amount of net taxable earned surplus.
If the shareholders of the corporations in the
hypothetical had waived their claim to a portion of the
Texas tax, as the Reagans did during the administrative
proceeding before the Tax Commission, and therefore claimed
credit only for the difference between 4.5% of net taxable
earned surplus and 0.25% of net taxable capital, the

9

Taxpayers would claim that shareholders of corporation A are
entitled to a credit of $15,500, shareholders of corporation
C are entitled to a credit of $13,000, and shareholders of
corporation B are not entitled to any credit, even though
all three once again had the same amount of net taxable
earned surplus.2
The absurd results due to fluctuations in net taxable
capital as illustrated by the above hypothetical led the
Missouri Supreme Court to hold that "dividing the Texas
tax's income component from its capital component is
impossible."

Brennan v. Director of Revenue, 937 S.W.2d

210, 212 (Mo. 1997).

The Tax Commission agrees with the

Missouri court and asserts that the Texas corporation
franchise tax is not a tax on income and cannot be divided
into income and capital components.

A tax which is

calculated utilizing a net earned surplus component as one
of multiple components does not constitute a tax on income
for which a credit can be claimed pursuant to § 59-10-

2

As acknowledged in the Brief of Appellees, the
shareholders in the cases of Perez v. Department of Rev, and
Taxation, 731 So. 2d 406 (La. App., 1st Dist. 1999) and Avni v.
Dept. of Rev., 2000 WL 1059520 (Or. Tax Magistrate Div. 2000),
like the Reagans, limited their claims to the difference between
4.5% of the net taxable earned surplus and 0.25% of the net
taxable capital.
10

106(1) .
IV.

THE TAXPAYERS AND AMICUS ERR IN FOCUSING ON THE
UTAH CORPORATE FRANCHISE TAX SINCE THE CALIFORNIA
AND TEXAS FRANCHISE TAXES ARE AT ISSUE RATHER THAN
THE UTAH TAX.
The Taxpayers devote a substantial portion of their

brief to an analysis of Utah's tax framework, including
provisions relating to the Utah corporate franchise tax and
the constitutionally mandated funding of public education.
As pointed out in the Tax Commission's initial brief, Utah's
corporate franchise tax is not at issue in this case.

At

issue is whether the Taxpayers are entitled to take a credit
to reduce their Utah individual income taxes by the amount
of California and Texas corporate franchise taxes paid by
the S corporations in which they have an ownership interest.
An amicus brief has been filed by the Utah State Board
of Education in support of the Taxpayers' position.
Ironically, if the Taxpayers prevail, individual income tax
revenues which are constitutionally mandated for public
education will be reduced in the amount of the California
and Texas corporate franchise taxes claimed as credits.
While the Tax Commission understands the Board of
Education's interest in suggesting that the Court's decision

11

should not undermine the Board's ability to assert that Utah
corporate franchise tax is a tax on income within the
meaning of Utah Const, art. XIII, § 5(5)(effective January
1, 2003, replacing art. XIII, § 12(3)), the Tax Commission
once again asserts that this is not the issue before the
Court.3

Rather, the issue is whether the statute granting a

credit against Utah individual income tax should be strictly
construed, thus limiting the credit to taxes imposed "on
income" by other states.
CONCLUSION
The Tax Commission has correctly denied Taxpayers
credits against their Utah individual income tax for
corporate franchise tax paid by the S corporations to
California and Texas since those taxes were not imposed on
income.

The Tax Commission respectfully requests that its

decisions in the Baker and Reagan cases be affirmed, and
that the District Court's determination in the consolidated
case of the MTC shareholders and the Macfarlanes be

3

Since the issue of whether Utah's corporate franchise tax
is constitutionally required to be used for public education is
not before the Court, at this time the Tax Commission neither
reaffirms nor retracts statements contained in its 2003-2004
Annual Report as quoted in the Brief of Appellees at p. 22.
12

reversed.
DATED this

&jks day

of August, 2005

MARK E. WAINWI^GHT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Appellant
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